

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**

that on many different occasions she attempted suicide, attempted to castrate herself, was raped, and was otherwise sexually assaulted by inmates at the maximum security prisons in which she was housed. Her complaint attacks in particular the Georgia Department of Corrections' Standard Operating Procedure on the Management of Transsexuals (the "Transgender SOP"). Diamond claimed that although the Transgender SOP recognized that gender dysphoria is a serious medical need requiring

31, 2015, the Georgia Department of Corrections released Diamond from custody. That resolved Diamond's remaining claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. (Docs. 67; 68). The Court now turns to the Defendants' remaining issues raised by the motions to dismiss.

## **II. BACKGROUND<sup>2</sup>**

### **A. Gender Dysphoria**

Ashley Diamond suffers from gender dysphoria. Gender dysphoria "is a medical condition in which an individual's gender identity and ... identification differ from the gender assigned at birth." (Doc. 3, ¶ 25). Diamond alleges medical professionals agree that gender dysphoria is a serious medical condition requiring treatment conforming to the "Standards of Care."<sup>3</sup> (Doc. 3, ¶¶ 27-28). These standards provide that transgender persons should be assessed individually and given appropriate treatment, which may consist of outward expression of "one's internal sense of gender identity," hormone therapy, and/or sex reassignment surgery, but not psychotropic drugs or counseling alone. (Doc. 3, ¶¶ 31-34). If left untreated or if treatment is discontinued, there is a "severe risk" the individual will experience "suicidality[,] the impulse to engage

## **B. GDOC's Policies on Transgender Inmates**

GDOC's now rescinded "Transgender SOP" recognized gender dysphoria as a serious medical condition and "discusse[d] the treatment regimen described in the Standards of Care." (Doc. 3, ¶¶ 46-47). However, only inmates identified as transgender at intake were eligible for treatment. (Doc. 3, ¶ 48). Even if an inmate was classified at intake as transgender, the Transgender SOP limited treatment to "'maintenance' of existing treatments—preventing healthcare personnel from initiating medical treatment that in their judgment is medically required for an inmate based on the Standards of Care." (Doc. 3, ¶ 49). Pursuant to the Transgender SOP, "inmates who [were] diagnosed with gender dysphoria after their initial diagnostic screening[ ] or who cannot show a history of treatment" were ineligible for treatments. (Doc. 3, ¶ 50). This policy, described as a "freeze-frame policy," prevented medical professionals from initiating treatment for gender dysphoria. (Doc. 3, ¶¶ 48-49, 142).

The Transgender SOP also discussed "securing proper placements for transgender inmates" and outlined procedures to reduce the risk of harm. (Doc. 3, ¶ 52). The SOP obligated the Statewide Medical Director, Defendant Sharon Lewis, to address housing placements for transgender inmates, particularly when safety issues arose. (Doc. 3, ¶¶ 52-53). The Prison Rape Elimination Act ("PREA") and GDOC's policies on PREA and sexual assault (the "Sexual Assault SOPs") also provide guidelines to ensure transgender inmates' safety from sexual assault.<sup>4</sup> (Doc. 3, ¶ 54). Pursuant to the Sexual Assault SOPs, personnel must immediately notify wardens, Sexual Assault Response Team ("SART") personnel, and Defendant Lewis when sexual

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<sup>4</sup> Diamond alleges that the Transgender SOP, PREA, and GDOC's Sexual Assault SOPs are provided to

abuse allegations are reported. (Doc. 3, ¶ 60). Finally, the Sexual Assault SOPs impose on wardens and SART personnel the “responsibility to arrange for medical and mental health examinations of suspected sexual assault victims[ ] and revised housing placements.” (Doc. 3, ¶ 61).

### **C. Diamond’s Background and Incarceration**

Since childhood, Diamond has “strongly identified” as female rather than her “assigned [male] gender.” (Doc. 3, ¶ 36). After attempting suicide at the age of 15, Diamond was diagnosed with gender dysphoria. (Doc. 3, ¶¶ 38-39). Since then, she has lived and expressed herself as female. (Doc. 3, ¶ 39). At 17, she began hormone treatments, and that treatment continued for over 17 years. (Doc. 3, ¶¶ 40, 42). As a result, she has developed female secondary sex characteristics, including “full breasts, a feminine shape, soft skin, and ... a reduction in male attributes.” (Doc. 3, ¶ 40).

On March 27, 2012, Diamond’s hormone therapy and “female expression”<sup>5</sup> were terminated after she was placed in GDOC’s custody for a non-violent offense. (Doc. 3, ¶¶ 42, 45). At intake, despite her female characteristics and GDOC’s knowledge that she was a transgender woman on hormone therapy, “Diamond was not evaluated for gender dysphoria, referred for treatment, or given a reasonably safe or appropriate housing placement.” (Doc. 3, ¶ 64). Despite her non-violent offender status, GDOC housed Diamond at Macon State Prison—a “closed-security facility for adult male felons” with frequent gang activity and assaults.<sup>6</sup> (Doc. 3, ¶¶ 64-66). Within a month, Diamond was “brutally sexually assaulted” by six gang members. (Doc. 3, ¶ 69).

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<sup>5</sup> Female expression means just what it suggests—dressing and otherwise presenting oneself as a woman.

<sup>6</sup> A closed-security facility is what GDOC calls its maximum security facilities. (Doc. 3, ¶ 65).

GDOC then transferred her to Baldwin State Prison, which is also a closed-security facility. (Doc. 3, ¶ 70). There, inmates again sexually assaulted Diamond. (Doc. 3, ¶ 71). Diamond reported these assaults, but personnel were slow to respond, lost her complaints and physical evidence of the assaults, failed to investigate, and told her she “brought her assaults upon herself” because she was transgender. (Doc. 3, ¶ 71). Pursuant to GDOC policies, Lewis was notified after each assault but “took no action.”<sup>7</sup> (Doc. 3, ¶¶ 60, 71).

GDOC mental health professionals diagnosed Diamond with post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and recommended a transfer to a medium-security facility because her transgender status made her more vulnerable to sexual assaults at a closed-security facility.<sup>8</sup> (Doc. 3, ¶ 72). They also diagnosed Diamond with gender dysphoria, noted her history of treatment and self-harm attempts, and recommended

concluded Diamond “stood a substantial risk of self-harm and suicide” without treatment and recommended Diamond receive hormone therapy and be permitted female gender expression. (Doc. 3, ¶ 75). Lewis “refused to authorize treatment,” and Diamond’s visits with Dr. Sloan were discontinued. (Doc. 3, ¶ 76).

#### **D. Rutledge State Prison**

On October 1, 2013, Diamond was transferred to Rutledge State Prison, a medium-security facility for non-violent inmates. (Doc. 3, ¶ 77). Upon Diamond’s arrival, Defendants Warden Shay Hatcher, Deputy Warden of Care and Treatment Ruthie Shelton, and John Thompson and Donna Silver, healthcare providers at Rutledge, received her records of “sexual assaults, gender dysphoria diagnosis, history of hormone treatment, past attempts at self-harm, and requests for ongoing care.” (Doc. 3, ¶ 78).

Diamond informed Thompson and Silver about her prior hormone therapy, Dr. Sloan’s assessment, and her “muscle spasms, chronic pain, and compulsion to engage in self-castration” from lack of treatment. (Doc. 3, ¶¶ 79-80). They denied her request for hormone treatments. (Doc. 3, ¶¶ 81, 84). In November 2013, Diamond contacted Shelton about the availability of treatment for gender dysphoria. (Doc. 3, ¶ 82). Shelton replied that “the Department does not offer therapy for this at this time” and also advised personnel that GDOC’s policy permits counseling but not the initiation of hormone therapy. (Doc. 3, ¶ 83). Diamond then contacted Warden Hatcher and requested treatment. (Doc. 3, ¶ 85). Shelton, on Hatcher’s behalf, wrote a letter acknowledging Diamond “was suffering from the denial of medical care” but only advised her “to develop better coping mechanisms.” (Doc. 3, ¶ 86).

After Diamond filed a grievance about the denial of treatment, Hatcher placed her in solitary confinement twice: once for “pretending to be a woman” and then again after attorneys visited her. (Doc. 3, ¶¶ 88-89). Hatcher visited Diamond in solitary in December 2013, and Diamond told him she was suicidal from lack of treatment. (Doc. 3, ¶ 89). When Hatcher left her in solitary, Diamond attempted suicide and self-castration, and she was “hospitalized on an emergency basis.” (Doc. 3, ¶ 90). Diamond alleges Hatcher and Lewis were told of her suicide and castration attempts. (Doc. 3, ¶ 90). Lewis subsequently informed Diamond that GDOC personnel “had handled matters appropriately” and instructed personnel “to continue their blanket policy of refusing to initiate gender dysphoria treatment[ ] and offering counseling in lieu of medically necessary treatment called for by the Standards of Care.” (Doc. 3, ¶ 91).

#### **E. Valdosta State Prison**

On December 31, 2013, Diamond was transferred to Valdosta State Prison, a closed-security facility. (Doc. 3, ¶ 92). Upon her arrival, Defendants Warden Marty Allen and David McCracken, the Director of Mental Health Services and PREA coordinator at the prison, received records “detailing her history of sexual assaults, gender dysphoria diagnosis, history of hormone treatment, past attempts at self-harm, and requests for ongoing care.” (Doc. 3, ¶¶ 20, 92).

In January and February 2014, Drs. Moody and Harrison, medical personnel at Valdosta State Prison, concluded Diamond “stood a high risk for suicide and self-harm” if she did not receive hormone therapy. (Doc. 3, ¶¶ 95-96). Dr. Moody advised Lewis of their conclusions and “sought to initiate treatment.” (Doc. 3, ¶ 97). But, adhering to the Transgender SOP, Lewis only permitted counseling. (Doc. 3, ¶ 97). Diamond was



hospitalized in March 2014 after again attempting suicide and self-castration. (Doc. 3, ¶ 104). Diamond then contacted GDOC Commissioner Brian Owens,<sup>9</sup> Allen, and McCracken regarding her lack of treatment. Diamond explained to the Commissioner her medical history and GDOC's repeated denial of treatment, but he refused to authorize treatment and continued to enforce GDOC's policy. (Doc. 3, ¶¶ 107, 109, 135). Allen responded with ridicule, disciplined her for her female expression, and "encouraged his staff to ridicule" her. (Doc. 3, ¶ 111). McCracken "deferred and delayed any action." (Doc. 3, ¶ 103).

In addition, GDOC personnel at Valdosta State Prison failed to provide Diamond with "safety accommodations." (Doc. 3, ¶ 93). Rather, she was simply told at intake that the prison "lacked the means to safely house transgender persons" and that she should "guard [her] booty" because she "stood a high likelihood of being sexually assaulted based on the inmate population, which included many gang members." (Doc. 3, ¶ 93).

The day after her transfer to Valdosta State Prison, Diamond was sexually assaulted by her cellmate. (Doc. 3, ¶ 94). Still, no action was taken, and she remained housed with the perpetrator who continued to sexually harass and coerce her. (Doc. 3, ¶ 94). Diamond was sexually assaulted again on February 9, 2014, and she was twice sexually assaulted in April 2014. (Doc. 3, ¶¶ 99, 106).

Lewis, Allen, and McCracken were notified after each report of sexual assault

safeguarding measures. (Doc. 3, ¶¶ 60, 94, 99). Specifically, Dr. Harrison told Allen and McCracken that Diamond should be transferred because she stood a high risk of sexual assault given Valdosta's inmate population. (Doc. 3, ¶ 98). Diamond also personally contacted Allen and McCracken about her safety. In April 2014, Diamond told Allen of the assaults, but he "refused to act." (Doc. 3, ¶ 105). In February, May, and June of 2014, Diamond told McCracken about the assaults and requested a transfer. (Doc. 3, ¶¶ 102-103, 114). But McCracken "deferred and delayed any action," resulting in further "sexual harassment and coercion." (Doc. 3, ¶¶ 103, 114-15). Diamond also contacted the Commissioner twice about her repeated sexual assaults at closed-security prisons and requested a transfer to a medium-security facility, but

remedies with respect to Count 3. Allen, Shelton, McCracken, Thompson, and Silver move to dismiss Count 1 for failure to state a claim, and Allen, Shelton, Lewis, and Hatcher argue they are entitled to qualified immunity. Lewis and McCracken move to dismiss Count 3 for failure to state a claim, and Lewis argues she is entitled to qualified immunity. Lewis moves to dismiss Count 4 for failure to state a claim and asserts qualified immunity.

#### **A. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies**

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title ... by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” “[W]hen a state provides a grievance procedure for its prisoners, as Georgia does here, an inmate alleging harm suffered from prison conditions must file a grievance and exhaust the remedies available under that procedure before pursuing a § 1983 lawsuit.” *Johnson v. Meadows*, 418 F.3d 1152, 1156 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Grievances should provide prison officials with fair notice of a problem and thus an opportunity to address the problem before a lawsuit is filed. *Chandler v. Crosby*, 379 F.3d 1278, 1287 (11th Cir. 2004). In determining whether a plaintiff has exhausted administrative remedies, the Court can resolve factual disputes using evidence from outside the pleadings. *Bryant v. Rich*, 530 F.3d 1368, 1376 (11th Cir. 2008).

The resolution of a failure-to-exhaust administrative remedies defense typically involves two steps. *Turner v. Burnside*, 541 F.3d 1077, 1082 (11th Cir. 2008). The court first looks to the parties’ factual allegations. *Id.* If they conflict, the court takes the

plaintiff's version of the facts as true. *Id.* “If, in that light, the defendant is entitled to have the complaint dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, it must be dismissed.” *Id.* If the complaint is not subject to dismissal under the plaintiff's version of

to the Internal Investigation Unit and/or the PREA coordinator for review.” (Docs. 35-2 at 18; 35-3, ¶ 20).

### **1. Whether Diamond Exhausted Her Claims for Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs**

Diamond contends Grievance #163506, which she filed at Rutledge State Prison and which the Court will call the “Rutledge grievance,” exhausted her claims for deliberate indifference to medical needs against Hatcher at Rutledge State Prison and Allen and McCracken at Valdosta State Prison. Diamond also contends Grievance #173610, which she filed at Valdosta State Prison, exhausted her claims for deliberate indifference against Allen and McCracken. Diamond fully exhausted both grievances pursuant to GDOC’s two-step grievance process. Hatcher, Allen, and McCracken, however, contend those grievances did not exhaust Diamond’s administrative remedies because they did not raise the same issues Diamond alleges against them in her complaint.

Diamond’s deliberate indifference claims against Hatcher, Allen, and McCracken are based on the following allegations. Diamond alleges that Hatcher, Allen, and McCracken were aware from GDOC’s Transgender SOP that gender dysphoria is a serious medical condition that can require hormone therapy and female gender expression. (Doc. 3, ¶¶ 46-47). Upon Diamond’s transfer to Rutledge State Prison on October 1, 2013, Hatcher received records detailing Diamond’s gender dysphoria diagnosis, history of hormone treatment, and requests for ongoing care. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 77-78). After being denied gender dysphoria treatment by medical professionals and being told by them and by Defendant Shelton that she would receive no treatment for gender dysphoria at Rutledge, Diamond wrote a letter to Hatcher explaining her gender

dysphoria and her ongoing need for treatment. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 79-85). Shelton, on Hatcher's behalf, responded that they "acknowledged [she] was suffering from the denial of medical care" and advised her "to develop better coping mechanisms" instead of referring her for treatment. (*Id.* at ¶ 86). *Thereafter*, Diamond filed the Rutledge grievance in which she grieved the "denial of treatment for her serious medical needs." (Docs. 3, ¶ 87; 49-4 at 9). "In response" to the grievance, Hatcher put Diamond in solitary confinement for nearly a week for "'pretending to be a woman.'" (Doc. 3, ¶ 88). Hatcher again put Diamond in solitary confinement after she was visited by attorneys who learned of her denial of treatment. (*Id.* at ¶ 89). During that period of confinement, Diamond told Hatcher "she was not simply 'pretending to be a woman,' but had serious medical needs requiring treatment." (*Id.*). Diamond also told Hatcher she was suicidal because she had been denied the care. (*Id.*). Still, Hatcher refused to refer Diamond for treatment. (*Id.* at ¶ 90). Immediately after that, Diamond attempted suicide and tried to sever her penis. (*Id.*).

Diamond was then transferred to Valdosta State Prison where Allen and McCracken were provided with "a transfer summary detailing [Diamond's] history of sexual assaults, gender dysphoria diagnosis, history of hormone treatment, past attempts at self-harm, and requests for ongoing care." (*Id.* at ¶ 92). Mental health professionals at Valdosta State Prison performed individualized assessments of Diamond and concluded that she should receive treatment for her gender dysphoria and that she was experiencing withdrawal because treatment had been denied. (*Id.* at ¶ 96). Further, they concluded the denial of medical care created a "high risk for suicide and self-harm." (*Id.*). However, she does not allege that Allen and McCracken were

aware of these conclusions. She does allege that she told McCracken about her gender dysphoria and that she needed medical care. (*Id.* at ¶ 102). She asked McCracken to transfer her to a facility where she could receive gender dysphoria care. (*Id.* at ¶ 103). In May 2014, Diamond “personally contacted Defendant Allen again regarding her gender dysphoria and ongoing need for treatment, but, in response, Defendant Allen began subjecting Ms. Diamond to harassment on account of her being transgender.” (*Id.* at ¶ 110).<sup>10</sup> Specifically, Allen ridiculed Diamond and encouraged staff to ridicule her for her female gender expression. (*Id.* at ¶ 111). On May 15, 2014, he disciplined her for her gender expression. (*Id.*). Diamond then alleges she complained about “Allen’s conduct and her ongoing denial of medical care.” (*Id.* at ¶ 112). This is an apparent reference to Grievance #173610. In May and June 2014, Diamond continued to speak with McCracken about her need for care. (*Id.* at ¶ 114).

**a. The Rutledge grievance**





based on the second doctor's denial of treatment.

Before she filed the grievance, she wrote Hatcher regarding her ongoing request for treatment. (Doc. 3, ¶¶ 79-85). Shelton, on Hatcher's behalf, acknowledged Diamond's letter, but prison officials at Rutledge still refused to refer her for treatment. (*Id.* at ¶ 86). Thus, Diamond alleges that Hatcher was directly involved in the conduct she complains about in the Rutledge grievance. He was not, as in *Parzyck*, an actor who only entered the picture after Diamond filed the Rutledge grievance. Thus, it is not necessary to turn to *Parzyck* to find that the grievance alerted prison officials at Rutledge State Prison, including Hatcher, to her deliberate indifference claims.

That Diamond alleges that Hatcher, while the grievance process was ongoing, placed her in solitary for "pretending to be a woman" and personally told her she would receive no treatment even though she was suicidal (*Id.* at ¶ 89) certainly buttresses Diamond's claim against Hatcher. But those allegations do not raise a new claim raising an issue different than the issue she raised in the Rutledge grievance.<sup>11</sup> Indeed, it was Hatcher himself who denied Diamond's grievance shortly after he visited her in solitary. (Doc. 49-4 at 3). Hatcher's alleged conduct during the grievance process that contributed to the ongoing denial of gender dysphoria treatment constitutes subsequent "harmful incident[s] in a string of related occurrences." See *Toenniges*, 600 F. App'x at

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<sup>11</sup> The Eleventh Circuit in *Parzyck* relied on the Fifth Circuit's decision in *Johnson v. Johnson*, 385 F.3d 503 (5th Cir. 2004). In discussing whether inmates are obligated to file subsequent grievances regarding the same issue, the Fifth Circuit cites to authority recognizing that "[r]igid 'issue exhaustion'" is "inappropriate when the fundamental issue is one of medical care from the same injury." *Sulton v. Wright*, 265 F. Supp. 2d 292, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), *abrogated on other grounds by Scott v. Gardner*, 287 F. Supp.

649. Thus, the Court easily finds that the Rutledge grievance exhausted Diamond's claim against Hatcher for deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs.

Diamond's deliberate indifference claims against Allen and McCracken, however,



grievance did not exhaust Diamond's administrative remedies with respect to the deliberate indifference claims against Allen and McCracken.

**b. Grievance #173610**

Diamond also contends Grievance #173610 exhausted her administrative remedies with respect to her deliberate indifference claims against Allen and McCracken. In this grievance, she complained that on May 15, 2014, she was told by

adornment. It is called Gender Identity Disorder. Valdosta State Prison is providing me [with] no treatment ....” (Doc. 49-5 at 3). In response to her grievance, either Allen or the superintendent<sup>12</sup> (1) quoted the policy that facial adornments are prohibited unless medically indicated and attached the policy with the response; (2) stated Diamond had no medical need for her facial adornments; and (3) told Diamond she was male and had to follow the rules. (*Id.* at 5). In her appeal, Diamond further explains that her medical condition is the reason for her feminine eyebrows. (*Id.* at 3). The response to Diamond’s appeal acknowledged the policy permitting facial adornments when medically necessary but denied the appeal. (*Id.* at 2).

The Court finds Grievance #173610 alerted prison officials to the fact that (1) Diamond is an inmate with gender dysphoria requesting treatment for her disorder; (2) Valdosta State Prison allegedly cannot adequately treat this disorder; and (3) Allen prohibits female gender expression, which Diamond alleges is a treatment for gender dysphoria, because “we aren’t going to do that[.] ‘This is a man’s facility.’” (*Id.* at 4).

Diamond alleges the s Tc-.3.1(.7(am)36.1(ond a.6(pre6(p01taem)36.6(4/TT6(i)n)3.5(on )20(a9fp[(p34

Accordingly, Hatcher, Allen, and McCracken's motions to dismiss Count I for failure to exhaust are **DENIED**.

and McCracken of Diamond's "ongoing safety issues and need for a transfer to a safer facility, based on [the] conclusion that Ms. Diamond stood a substantial risk of continued sexual assault at Valdosta based on the inmate composition." (*Id.* at ¶ 98).

Nevertheless, Allen and McCracken "deferred and delayed" action on the recommendations to revise Diamond's placement. (*Id.* at ¶ 103).

Diamond was again assaulted on February 9, 2014, and she alleges that Allen and McCracken were notified of the assault. (*Id.* at ¶ 99). They again refused to revise Diamond's placement. (*Id.*).

On February 26, 2014, "Diamond personally contacted Defendant McCracken regarding her safety." (*Id.* at ¶ 102). She told McCracken that she had been repeatedly sexually assaulted and that she feared for her safety. (*Id.*). Diamond asked McCracken to arrange for her transfer to a safer facility, but again McCracken "deferred and delayed action." (*Id.* at ¶ 103).

In April 2014 Diamond contacted Allen about her safety concerns. (*Id.* at ¶ 105). She told Allen about the sexual assaults and her "ongoing fears for her safety" and asked to be transferred to a safer facility. (*Id.*). Allen refused. (*Id.*). Also in April 2014, Diamond was sexually assault two more times. (*Id.* at ¶ 106). These assaults were also reported, and Allen and McCracken were notified of the assaults "pursuant to GDC policy." (*Id.*). They still took no action. (*Id.*)

In May and June 2014, Diamond again spoke with McCracken about the repeated sexual assaults and the continued sexual harassment and coercion that she was experiencing. (*Id.* at ¶ 114). She again asked McCracken to arrange for her transfer, but he again "delayed and deferred any action." (*Id.* at ¶ 115).



Diamond incorporates these allegations in her failure-to-protect claim against Allen and McCracken and generally alleges that they along with certain other defendants were aware of her many assaults and their obligations under PREA and

consequences for all involved unless [Internal Affairs] move him and do a full investigation of their pleas for help.” (*Id.* at 8). In his response to the grievance, Allen stated: “You are housed in Tier I at this time. [Y]ou have not provided the names of any staff involved in the making of the YouTube videos. We would be happy to provide any information you wish to give to Internal Affairs for their review and investigation.” (*Id.* at 7). In her appeal of the grievance denial, Diamond reiterated her safety concerns and emphasized that “Internal Investigations should have been involved from the beginning” and that “Valdosta State Prison failed to respond to any and all sexual abuse allegations, and even returned grievances involving sexual abuse allegations.” (*Id.* at

help us.” (Doc. 56 at 4). In even more conclusory fashion, McCracken simply argues that the Valdosta failure-to-protect grievance addressed only YouTube videos and Diamond’s fear of retaliation for staff involvement in the videos. (Doc. 38-1 at 8).

It is apparent that it is Allen and McCracken who have plucked words out of context. The Valdosta failure-to-protect grievance does not say that Diamond is grieving her personal safety because of staff involvement with the YouTube videos. While Diamond acknowledged that she had been placed in isolation “pending investigation for phone activity,” she grieved “my personal safety and mental health being housed at Valdosta State Prison, “pending investigation but because of staff involv[ement] w[ith] making videos to supposedly ‘help us.’” (Doc. 49-6 at 6). She says her safety is “a big concern, as well as retaliation for disclosing info about staff involvement in filming.” (*Id.*). The grievance coordinator read Diamond’s grievance to grieve her personal safety *and* fear of retaliation because of investigations of the YouTube videos. He understood Diamond to be asking for an Internal Affairs investigation of “their pleas for help.” (*Id.* at 8). The reference to Internal Affairs by Diamond and the grievance coordinator is significant because grievances involving sexual assault “are automatically forwarded ... to Internal Investigation Unit.” (Doc. 35-2 at 18).

Based on these facts, the Court concludes that the Valdosta failure-to-protect grievance was sufficient to put prison officials on notice of Diamond’s allegations that the prison officials at Valdosta State Prison failed to protect her from sexual assault. That prison officials for some reason ultimately decided to treat the grievance as one for



**b. The Baldwin grievances**

After Diamond was transferred from Valdosta State Prison to Baldwin State Prison, she filed the three Baldwin grievances alleging she was sexually assaulted at Valdosta State Prison on multiple occasions. Allen and McCracken contend these grievances were untimely and thus did not exhaust Diamond's failure to protect claims against them.<sup>17</sup>



internal affairs was the “final action ... taken on the [g]rievance[s] and terminate[d] the grievance procedure.” (Doc. 35-2 at 18). In other words, the grievance coordinator accepted and reviewed the grievances on the merits.<sup>19</sup> Given these facts, GDOC waived any deadline for filing the Baldwin grievances.<sup>20</sup>

Accordingly, Allen's and McCracken's motions to dismiss Count III for failure to exhaust is **DENIED**.

## **B. Failure to State a Claim and Qualified Immunity**

### **1. Motion to Dismiss Standard**

To avoid dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “At the motion to dismiss stage, all well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, and the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” *Garfield v. NDC Health Corp.*, 466 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, “where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the

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process. These grievances are automatically forwarded ... to the Internal Investigations Unit and/or the PREA Coordinator for review and whatever action is deemed appropriate. (Doc. 35-2 at 18).

<sup>19</sup> Pursuant to GDOC procedure, the grievance coordinator's actions ended the grievance process, relieving Diamond of the obligation to take further action. (Doc. 35-2). Further, GDOC procedure does not require the grievance coordinator to explicitly state that untimeliness has been waived.

<sup>20</sup> The grievance coordinator's handling of the Baldwin grievances is entirely consistent with the testimony of GDOC officials that there is no time limit for filing sexual assault grievances. It is also consistent with Diamond's argument that PREA bars prisons from imposing such a deadline. See 28 CFR § 115.52(b)(1). GDOC's grievance procedure incorporates PREA's guidelines that inmates do not have a time limit to submit a grievance regarding sexual assault. “If an offender files a grievance involving sexual assault ...[,] such actions automatically end the grievance process. These grievances are automatically forwarded ... to Internal Investigation Unit and/or the PREA Coordinator for review.” (Doc. 35-2 at 18). This is what happened in Diamond's case, and this closed the grievance process.

complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). “[C]onclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.” *Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis*, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002). The complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Where there are dispositive issues of law, a court may dismiss a claim regardless of the alleged facts. *Marshall Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall Cty. Gas Dist.*, 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1993).

## **2. Qualified Immunity Standard**

“Qualified immunity offers complete protection for individual public officials performing discretionary functions ‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” *Sherrod v. Johnson*, 667 F.3d 1359, 1363 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting *Harlow v. Fitzgerald*, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “‘Once discretionary authority is established, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show that qualified immunity should not apply.’”<sup>21</sup> *Edwards v. Shanley*, 666 F.3d 1289, 1294 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting *Lewis v. City of W. Palm Beach*, 561 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir. 2009)). To meet this burden, a plaintiff must establish that “the officer’s conduct amounted to a constitutional violation” and “the right violated was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the violation.” *Lewis*, 561 F.3d at

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<sup>21</sup> For each assertion of qualified immunity, there is no dispute the Defendants were acting within their discretionary authority. Accordingly, the Court assumes for each assertion of qualified immunity that the Defendants have established they were acting within their discretionary authority.



1291. This two-step analysis may be done in whatever order is deemed most appropriate for the case. *Id.* (citing *Pearson v. Callahan*, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)).

The clearly established law<sup>22</sup> must provide a defendant with “fair warning” that

and Hatcher do not contend Diamond failed to state a claim against them but argue they are entitled to qualified immunity.<sup>23</sup>

#### **a. Whether Diamond Has Alleged a Constitutional Violation**

Allen, Shelton, McCracken, Thompson, and Silver argue Diamond's deliberate indifference claims against them fail because she has not sufficiently alleged they had subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm. (Docs. 35-1 at 11; 38-1 at 11-12, 14). "[D]eliberate indifference to [the] serious medical needs of [a] prisoner[ ] constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain ... proscribed by the Eighth Amendment." *Farrow v. West*, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting *Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). "[A] prisoner must shoulder three burdens" to bring a claim for deliberate indifference. *Goebert*, 510 F.3d at 1326. First, the prisoner must satisfy an objective component by alleging there was a serious medical need. *Id.* (citing *Bozeman v. Orum*, 422 F.3d 1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 2005)). Second, he must satisfy the subjective component by alleging that the prison official was deliberately indifferent to

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<sup>23</sup> A comment about Lewis, Allen, Hatcher and Shelton's joint brief is appropriate. (Doc. 35-1). They jointly filed a one paragraph motion to dismiss in which they argue Diamond's complaint should be dismissed "on the basis of failure to state a claim, qualified immunity, and other grounds as set forth in the brief filed herewith." (Doc. 35). In their joint brief, Lewis and Hatcher do not argue that Count 1 fails to state a claim for deliberate indifference against them. Allen does not argue that Count 3 fails to state a failure-to-protect claim against him, nor does he argue that he is entitled to qualified immunity for that claim. Naturally enough, this led Diamond, when summarizing the motions in her brief, to acknowledge that Lewis and Hatcher did not contend Count 1 failed to state a claim and that Allen did not contend that Count 3 failed to state a claim or that he was entitled to qualified immunity for that claim. (Doc. 49 at 8-9). Lewis, Hatcher and Allen have never challenged this characterization. The Court does not think for a moment that counsel have attempted to "sandbag" Diamond or the Court. Still, the Court notes that the joint brief states that Diamond's allegations establish that the Defendants were acting in their discretionary authority and that the "burden thus shifts to the Plaintiff to show that Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity." (Doc. 35-1 at 25). It would not be plausible for Lewis, Hatcher, and Allen to now argue that this assertion should have alerted Diamond that she had to address the two prongs of qualified immunity as to Lewis, Hatcher, and Allen that they never raised. Nevertheless, the Court notes that the allegations against Lewis and Hatcher in Count 1, as summarized in footnotes 26 and 27, are clearly sufficient to state a claim. Further, the allegations against Allen in Count 3, as summarized in Section III.A.2, are clearly sufficient to state a claim against him. Additionally, as discussed in Section III.B.4.b., clearly established law provided Allen, like Lewis, with fair warning his conduct violated Diamond's Eighth Amendment right to be protected from assaults by other inmates.





deliberate indifference to the medical needs of a transgender inmate. 558 F. App'x 907 (11th Cir. 2014). There, the inmate alleged (1) “the medically-accepted and appropriate treatment” for gender dysphoria included hormone treatment, gender expression, and sex reassignment surgery; (2) the defendant was “aware of the medically necessary treatment”; (3) the defendant knew about the inmate’s hormone treatment history and the symptoms he suffered from lack of treatment; but (4) the defendant denied him hormone treatment or a referral to staff who could prescribe treatment. *Id.* at 908. The Eleventh Circuit held these allegations were sufficient to satisfy the subjective inquiry. *Id.* at 911.

Similar to the allegations in *Ward*, the inmate alleged that the defendant knew of the inmate's medical needs and the symptoms he suffered from lack of treatment; but the defendant denied him hormone treatment or a referral to staff who could prescribe treatment. *Id.* at 908. The Eleventh Circuit held these allegations were sufficient to satisfy the subjective inquiry. *Id.* at 911.

Diamond alleges this repeated denial of treatment resulted in suicide ideation and compulsion to castrate herself, multiple suicide and castration attempts, clinically significant depression, anxiety, mental anguish, and a “regression of hormonally-induced physical effects,” as well as “chest pain, muscle spasms, heart palpitations, severe vomiting,” and other physical symptoms. (Doc. 3, ¶¶ 73, 90, 104, 121, 138-39). Clearly, Diamond has sufficiently alleged Allen, Shelton, McCracken, Thompson, and Silver were deliberately indifferent to Diamond’s serious medical needs by their repeated refusal to provide, authorize, or refer her for treatment they knew was medically necessary, thus causing and perpetuating psychological and physical harm.<sup>25</sup>

**b. Whether the Constitutional Right was Clearly Established**

Allen, Shelton, Lewis,<sup>26</sup> and Hatcher<sup>27</sup> contend they are entitled to qualified immunity because no clearly established law gave them fair warning their conduct

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<sup>25</sup> Thompson, Silver, and McCracken also contend the deliberate indifference claims against them fail because they were adhering to policy and had no “means to cure the alleged risk.” (Doc. 38-1 at 12-15). The Court is not persuaded by this “simply following orders” defense. Following the Transgender SOP does not insulate them from potential liability. Diamond alleges that despite their knowledge of her medical condition and her compulsion to castrate and harm herself, they did not exercise any independent medical judgment, inform any competent authorities about Diamond’s need for care, or make a referral or recommendation for treatment, as other GDOC medical providers, such as Drs. Sloan, Moody, and Harrison, had done. See *Waldrop v. Evans*, 871 F.2d 1030, 1036 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding there was a genuine issue of fact whether a doctor who treated the plaintiff’s medical needs was deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff’s psychiatric needs by failing to notify competent authorities about such needs because “prison officials have an obligation to take action or to inform competent authorities once the officials have knowledge of a prisoner’s need for medical or psychiatric care.”). The Court also rejects Thompson and Silver’s argument that Diamond’s claim fails because they prescribed her counseling and psychotropic drugs and thus did not disregard her medical needs. At this stage in the litigation, Diamond has sufficiently alleged the Defendants knew psychotropic drugs and counseling alone .9(t)-16.3(ent)-16.3( 16.4(i)3heoand t)-16.4(hus)15f.8(t)-16.4(eat)-16.4(ed )23.8(t)-16.4(, k)-8.5(new)23.2pu4(ed )26.4 81 0 TD-.ntSee Waals-32.5(p)esuc4.4(3.8( ))TJT\*o)23.8(ann9.8095 0 TD-.0TD- T-.0002 T( 38 -)15i)-24.4(n5582d 1030,-)16 s T 38 dieged t5 an 15.3( ss)-24.3(o)r)-87(7( ))JTJ9(a).1(s)188(i)-2e).1(n)29 clsk78( )23.8(378(i)-2e).1(s)188(i)-2e(egar)-9(

violated Diamond's right to constitutionally adequate care for her serious medical needs. The Eleventh Circuit has "consistently held that knowledge of the need for medical care and an intentional refusal to provide that care constitutes deliberate indifference." *Adams v. Poag*, 61 F.3d 1537, 1543-44 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing *Carswell v. Bay Cty.*, 854 F.2d 454, 457 (11th Cir. 1988); see also *H.C. by Hewett v. Jarrard*, 786 F.2d 1080, 1086 (11th Cir. 1986) ("[T]he failure to provide diagnostic care and medical treatment known to be necessary [i]s deliberate indifference."); *Ancata*, 769 F.2d at 704. Put another way, "[a] core principle of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence ... is that prison officials with knowledge of the need for [medical] care may not, by failing to provide care, delaying care, or providing grossly inadequate care, cause a prisoner to needlessly suffer the pain resulting from his or her illness." *McElligott*, 182 F.3d at 1257. Diamond, citing the Eleventh Circuit's unpublished opinion in *Kothmann*, argues these clearly established "core" principles gave the Defendants fair warning that their refusal to provide Diamond with treatment they knew was medically necessary for her gender dysphoria violated her constitutional right to adequate medical care. See *Kothmann*, 558 F. App'x at 912 (reasoning the same).

Although "mindful of *Kothmann*," the Defendants argue the Eleventh Circuit denied qualified immunity because of the case's specific facts which they contend are

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solitary where she continued to complain about the denial of treatment and her suicidal impulses and actually attempted suicide and self-castration; and (4) continued to enforce the Transgender SOP despite the recommendations of medical professionals and Diamond's suicide attempts. (Doc. 3, ¶¶ 33-34, 46-47, 76, 90-91, 97).

<sup>27</sup> The allegations as to Hatcher, who also does not contend Diamond failed to state a claim against him, are relevant to whether he violated a clearly established right. Diamond alleges Hatcher: (1) knew the medically accepted and recognized gender dysphoria treatment, as well as what medical care was inadequate, pursuant to the Standards of Care; (2) received Diamond's records detailing her gender

distinguishable from Diamond's, and at a minimum, "nothing in *Kothmann*, or in any binding authority ... suggests that 'gender expression' is a necessary treatment for gender dysphoria." (Doc. 35-1 at 27-28). This argument misconstrues the Eleventh Circuit's qualified immunity analysis. As discussed, Kothmann, like Diamond, alleged the defendant (1) knew "hormone treatment was the recognized, accepted, and medically necessary treatment" for gender dysphoria; (2) knew Kothmann's hormone treatment history and continued need for it; but (3) knowingly refused to provide this treatment. *Kothmann*, 558 F. App'x at 911-12. The Eleventh Circuit held these allegations sufficiently stated the violation of a clearly established constitutional right. *Id.* Specifically, the court rejected the defendant's argument that she did not violate a clearly established right because no prior binding precedent had recognized that transgender inmates have a right to hormone treatment. *Id.* Relying on binding precedent,<sup>28</sup> the Eleventh Circuit reasoned "the state of the law was sufficiently clear to put [the defendant] on notice that refusing to provide [the transgender inmate] with what she knew to be medically necessary hormone treatments was a violation of the Eighth Amendment." *Id.* at 912.

Here, for the same reasons, the law was sufficiently clear to give the Defendants fair warning that their refusal to provide Diamond with treatment they knew was medically necessary or to refer her for treatment violated Diamond's Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical care. And, as noted in *Kothmann*, binding precedent establishing that transgender inmates have a right to receive the specific treatment at issue—in this case, hormone therapy and female gender expression—is not required to

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<sup>28</sup> *McElligot*, 182 F.3d at 1255; *Jarrard*, 786 F.2d at 1086; *Ancata*, 769 F.2d at 704.



overcome the Defendants' qualified immunity defense.<sup>29</sup> *Id.* at 911-12. Accordingly, Allen, Shelton, Lewis, and Hatcher are not entitled to qualified immunity from Diamond's deliberate-indifference-to-medical-needs claim.

#### **4. Failure to Protect**

Diamond alleges Lewis, Allen, and McCracken were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm Diamond faced in closed-security facilities. Lewis and McCracken argue Diamond failed to state a claim against them. Lewis also contends she is entitled to qualified immunity.<sup>30</sup>

##### **a. Whether Diamond Has Alleged a Constitutional Violation**

Under the Eighth Amendment, prison officials have a duty to "take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates." *Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega*, 748 F.3d 1090, 1099 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting *Farmer*, 511 U.S. at 832). More to the point, they "have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners." *Id.* (quoting *Farmer*, 511 U.S. at 833) (internal quotation marks omitted). Of course, not every injury an inmate suffers at the hands of another inmate gives rise to constitutional liability. "A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment 'when a substantial risk of serious harm, *of which the official is subjectively aware*, exists[,] the official does not respond reasonably to the risk,'" and the official's actions or inaction causes the injury. *Id.* (quoting *Carter v. Galloway*, 352 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir.

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<sup>29</sup> As also noted in *Kothmann*, at this stage in the litigation, the Court need not decide whether "hormone treatment [and gender expression] in fact [were] medically necessary to treat" Diamond's gender dysphoria or whether the Defendants "knew in fact" that these treatments were medically necessary for Diamond. *Id.* at 911. Rather, the Court need only decidiamond.scesswanigaD0 Tw[(K)-8.2(s) yik.

2003)); see also *Goodman v. Kimbrough*, 718 F.3d 1325, 1331 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal

told McCracken about her sexual assaults. (Doc. 3, ¶¶ 18, 20, 52-55, 60-61, 65-67, 69, 71, 92, 94, 98-99, 102-03, 106, 114-15, 146).

Lewis and McCracken contend these allegations are insufficient to demonstrate they had the requisite “subjective knowledge required by the deliberate indifference standard.”<sup>32</sup> (Docs. 35-1 at 19; 38-1 at 15-16). Lewis specifically argues the allegations that she failed to follow policy<sup>33</sup> and that she was notified after each assault are insufficient to establish subjective awareness.<sup>34</sup> The Supreme Court in *Farmer* held that circumstantial evidence and the obviousness of the substantial risk of harm, not just

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<sup>32</sup> The Defendants do not contend Diamond failed to allege a substantial risk of serious harm. Nor could they. Diamond has alleged she is a transgender inmate who has been continually sexually harassed and sexually assaulted at closed-security facilities. Diamond has easily satisfied the objective inquiry. See *Farmer*, 511 U.S. at 833 (“[G]ratuitously allowing the beating or rape of one prisoner by another serves no ‘legitimate penological objectiv[e].’” (citation omitted) (alteration in original)).

<sup>33</sup> Lewis’s argument that she cannot be held liable simply because she disregarded her obligations under PREA and GDOC policy is based on a misreading of Diamond’s allegations. She does not allege Lewis is liable simply because she violated rules and policies, but rather alleges that these rules and policies were among the many factors and facts upon which she bases her claims.

<sup>34</sup> In her motion, Lewis also argues Diamond’s “apparent attempt to impose supervisory liability” based on an alleged widespread pattern of abuse fails. (Doc. 35-1 at 20-21). In her reply brief, Lewis argues Diamond waived any argument regarding Lewis’s contention that Diamond’s allegations are insufficient to “state a supervisory claim against her.” (Doc. 56 at 10 n.5). In her response brief, Diamond states that she is alleging Lewis had actual knowledge, not constructive knowledge. (Doc. 49 at 14). This response does not amount to a waiver. It is true supervisors cannot be held liable under § 1983 “for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” *Hartley v. Parnell*, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A supervisor can only be held liable if the supervisor participated directly in the unconstitutional conduct or if a causal connection exists between the supervisor’s actions and the alleged constitutional violations. *Cottone v. Jenne*, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003).

[C]ausal connection can be established when a history of widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he fails to do so. Alternatively, the causal connection may be established when a supervisor’s custom or policy ... result[s] in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights or when facts support an inference that the supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so.

*Harrison v. Culliver*, 746 F.3d 1288, 1298 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting *Cottone*, 326 F.3d at 1360). The Court interprets Diamond’s argument to be that sufficient facts support an inference Lewis knew subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so. To the extent Diamond has alleged Lewis was aware Diamond faced a substantial risk of harm based on a widespread pattern of abuse, that claim is subsumed by the failure-to-train claim against Lewis in her individual capacity and is addressed below.

actual notification, may be used to establish subjective awareness. 511 U.S. at 842-44. Further, allegations suggesting the substantial risk was “long-standing, pervasive, [or] well-documented” and the defendants “had been exposed to information concerning the risk and thus must have known about it ... could be sufficient ... to find that [the defendants] had actual knowledge of the risk.” *Id.* at 842-43 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). When analyzing subjective awareness, courts have considered the obviousness of the risk to inmate safety, the defendant’s knowledge about the vulnerability of certain types of inmates to risk of harm, prison policies pertaining to such inmates, and their housing placements. See *Greene v. Bowles*, 361 F.2d 290, 294 (6th Cir. 2004); *Taylor v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr.*, 69 F.3d 76, 81-82 (6th Cir. 1995); *Green v. Hooks*, 2013 WL 4647493, at \*2-\*3 (S.D. Ga.); *Shaw v. District of Columbia*, 944 F. Supp. 2d 43, 59-60 (D.D.C. 2013) (“Plaintiff ... points ... to [reports, regulations, and professional guidelines] ... to provide factual grounding to support the inference that the risk to transgender detainees was obvious, well-documented, and known to [d]efendants.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); *Newsome v. Higham*, 2010 WL 1258013, at \*3-\*4 (M.D. Ga.); *Farmer v. Carlson*, 685 F. Supp. 1335, 1342 (M.D. Penn. 1988) (“Clearly, placing plaintiff, a twenty-one year old transsexual, into the general population at ... a [high-]security institution, could pose a significant threat to internal security in general and to plaintiff in particular.”).

In her complaint, Diamond has covered the waterfront with her allegations tending to prove subjective awareness. She has alleged that a transgender inmate’s vulnerability to assault at a closed-security male facility was obvious to Lewis and McCracken and that PREA and GDOC policies made clear transgender inmates are

highly vulnerable to sexual assault. Further, she alleges Lewis and McCracken spoke with her directly about her transgender status and were aware from notifications and records<sup>35</sup> she was repeatedly sexually assaulted at three different closed-security facilities. Diamond met with McCracken at least three times about her sexual assaults, and Dr. Harrison contacted him directly about Diamond's vulnerability to assault at Valdosta State Prison given its population of violent offenders.<sup>36</sup>

Diamond's allegations paint a picture dramatically different than the typical failure-to-protect claim asserted by inmates. The usual failure-to-protect claim involves a single assault. Thus, the inmate must allege facts tending to establish the requisite subjective awareness before that single assault occurred. As the cases cited by the Defendants illustrate, this can be a difficult task. But here Diamond alleges a series of assaults. While she does not concede that Lewis and McCracken did not have subjective awareness of the risk of harm before the first assault that occurred on their respective watches, she alleges that after they received notice of that assault, and then the next, and the next, and so on, they clearly had subjective awareness of the risk of

widespread nature of the conditions ... suggest [the defendant] 'had been exposed to information concerning the risk and thus must have known about it.'" (quoting *Farmer*, 511 U.S. at 842-43)).

In sum, these allegations are not threadbare recitations of the subjective awareness element. Rather, Diamond alleges the full gamut of facts *Farmer* contemplated to show subjective awareness. Yet, despite being aware of the risk of sexual assault and despite having the authority and obligation to take reasonable safety measures after each incident, Lewis and McCracken, according to Diamond, failed to take any action. As a result, the substantial risk of harm remained unabated, and Diamond suffered further sexual assaults. Clearly, Diamond has sufficiently alleged a plausible failure-to-protect claim against Lewis and McCracken.

#### **b. Whether the Constitutional Right was Clearly Established**

Lewis is not entitled to qualified immunity if clearly established law gave her fair warning her conduct violated Diamond's Eighth Amendment right to be protected from assault by other inmates. "A prisoner has a right, secured by the eighth ... amendment[], to be reasonably protected from constant threat of violence and sexual assault by his fellow inmates[.]" *Purcell ex rel. Estate of Morgan v. Toombs Cty., Ga.*, 400 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also *Farmer*, 511 U.S. at 833-34. Diamond argues *Farmer* gave Lewis fair warning that her failure to take any action to protect Diamond from the substantial risk of sexual assault she faced violated her Eighth Amendment right to be reasonably protected from sexual assault. (Doc. 49 at 23 n.10). There, a transgender inmate, allegedly known to

to a substantial risk of sexual assault by placing her in general population at a “higher security facility” known for its violent environment and history of assaults. *Farmer*, 511 U.S. at 825. The Supreme Court emphasized the constitutional right of prisoners to be reasonably protected from the violence of other inmates. *Id.* at 833 (“[G]ratuitously allowing the beating or rape of one prisoner by another serves no ‘legitimate penological objectiv[e].’” (citation omitted)). The Supreme Court ultimately held that “a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment ... if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” *Id.* at 847.<sup>37</sup>

Again, Diamond alleges Lewis was aware Diamond was a transgender female, knew she had been repeatedly sexually assaulted at closed-security male facilities, and knew she continued to be repeatedly sexually (a)19lled fte V10(m)-.8(t)-14.8(d 19.2(lotanS)10.t).8(ote kewi stookno ‘20((ac)21.i)-14.26son Tedor 16.6(eg, ew)25.6(i)-14.26s ,blentTrl f serx23.6(lal)5.24 mati, had 19.3( tf)19.3(l)-14.7(t)-3.9(ew)25.63aurn19.3(l)-14.7(tg to20.9(”at rh)19.3(rstf)19.3(l)-53(l)-14

## 5. Failure to Train

Diamond alleges Lewis failed to adequately train subordinates regarding the medical treatment and safety of transgender inmates. Lewis contends Diamond failed to sufficiently allege a failure-to-train claim, and she is entitled to qualified immunity.

### a. Whether Diamond Has Alleged a Constitutional Violation

Diamond alleges Lewis, as GDOC's Statewide Medical Director, was a final policy- and decision-maker regarding the care and safety of transgender inmates and responsible for implementing policies and providing training regarding the same. (Doc. 3, ¶18). "[U]nder § 1983, a supervisor can be held liable for failing to train his or her employees only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the officers come into contact." *Keith v. DeKalb Cty., Ga.*, 749 F.3d 1034, 1052 (11th Cir. 2014) (alteration, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). To sufficiently allege a supervisor violated a plaintiff's constitutional rights for failing to train subordinates, a plaintiff "must demonstrate that the supervisor had 'actual or constructive notice that a particular omission in their training program causes [his or her] employees to violate citizens' constitutional rights,' and that armed with that knowledge the supervisor chose to retain that training program." *Id.* (quoting *Connick v. Thompson*, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1360 (2011)). A plaintiff establishes a supervisor's notice when the need for more or different training is obvious—such as when there has been a history of widespread abuse by subordinates that has put the supervisor on notice of the need for corrective measures, or when the failure to train is likely to result in a constitutional violation. See *Williams v. Limestone Cty. Ala.*, 198 F. App'x 893, 896 (11th Cir. 2006); *Fundiller v. City of Cooper City*, 777 F.2d 1436, 1443 (11th Cir. 1985).



Diamond premises her failure-to-train claims against Lewis on two alleged deficiencies in training. Diamond alleges Lewis: (1) inadequately trained subordinates to provide constitutionally adequate gender dysphoria treatment to transgender inmates, and (2) inadequately trained subordinates to reasonably protect and safely house transgender inmates. Specifically, Diamond contends Lewis was aware of these inadequacies from a widespread pattern of abuse by subordinates. Lewis argues that Diamond's allegations are formulaic recitation of the elements for a failure-to-train claim and that case law requires more than Diamond's own experiences to establish a "pattern" or "widespread abuse." (Docs. 35-1 at 23; 56 at 11).

The Court is unaware of any Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit authority, and Lewis cites none, requiring a plaintiff to establish a widespread pattern of abuse based on prior incidents involving *other* inmates who suffered the same abuse. It is true that in cases involving an inmate alleging a widespread pattern of abuse at a prison, the Eleventh Circuit has looked to whether the plaintiff points to the experiences of other inmates to determine whether the plaintiff's experience was simply an isolated occurrence. See, e.g., *Goebert*, 510 F.3d at 1332; *Craig v. Floyd*, 643 F.3d 1306, 1310-11 (11th Cir. 2011). These cases often involve a prisoner alleging a single isolated incident at a specific prison or occasional, isolated occurrences within a single prison. See, e.g., *Harrison v. Culliver*, 746 F.3d 1288, 1299-1300 (11th Cir. 2014); *Goebert*, 510 F.3d at 1332; *Craig*, 643 F.3d at 1310-11.

But Diamond's complaint is different. Diamond's allegations involve repeated incidents alleging failure-to-protect from sexual assaults at multiple GDOC privo-

whether the alleged pattern involves single or multiple inmates or single or multiple facilities, the critical inquiry here is whether Diamond has sufficiently alleged a widespread pattern of abuse *by prison officials* that put Lewis on notice. See, e.g., *Belcher*, 30 F.3d at 1397-98 (“Failure to train can amount to deliberate indifference ... when there exists a history of abuse *by subordinates* that has put the supervisor on notice of the need for corrective measures.” (italics added)); *Thornton v. El-Amin*, 2012 WL 529998, at \*13 (N.D. Ga.) (“Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence of a widespread pattern of abuse *by officers* of the DeKalb County Police Department.” (italics added)). That the pattern of abuse involved only Diamond does not mean the pattern was insufficient to put Lewis on notice of the problem.

“The deprivations that constitute widespread abuse sufficient to notify the supervising official must be obvious, flagrant, rampant[,] and of continued duration, rather than isolated occurrences.” *West v. Tillman*, 496 F.3d 1321, 1329 (11th Cir. 2007). For example, at the motion to dismiss stage, allegations of multiple incidents of abuse may sufficiently demonstrate a pattern. See *Buckley v. Barbour Cty., Ala.*, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1344 (M.D. Ala. 2008). Also, where a plaintiff alleges a defendant was aware of allegedly inadequate supervision from a prior incident, from complaints related to the inadequate supervision, and from information the plaintiff faced a risk of harm from the inadequacy, the Eleventh Circuit has held the plaintiff sufficiently alleged the official “acted with deliberate indifference toward [the plaintiff’s] rights in failing to ensure that competent officials took steps to protect [the plaintiff].” *Greason v. Kemp*, 891 F.2d 829, 837 & n.18, 838 (11th Cir. 1990). In contrast, where the need for training is not “so obvious” and where the plaintiff bases her failure-to-train claim on a single incident,

courts have held the plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege a widespread pattern of abuse. See, e.g., *Weiland*, \_\_\_F.3d\_\_\_, 2015 WL 4098270, at \*10 (11th Cir.).

With this precedent in mind, the Court will address the allegedly inadequate training regarding the medical treatment of transgender inmates and the reasonable protection of transgender inmates in turn.

Diamond alleges she went without treatment at each facility and experienced intensifying suicide ideation and impulses to commit self-harm, among other physical and psychological harm. (Doc. 3, ¶¶ 5, 73, 75, 90, 96, 104, 118, 121-22). See *Am. Fed'n of Labor & Cong. of Indus. Orgs. v. City of Miami, Fla.*, 637 F.3d 1178, 1189 (11th

there is a causal connection between the actions of the supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation. ... A causal connection may be established when ... facts support an inference the supervisor directed subordinates to act unlawfully.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Accordingly, at this stage in the litigation, Diamond has sufficiently alleged a plausible claim that Lewis failed to train subordinates to provide adequate medical treatment to transgender inmates and that this failure led to the deliberate indifference to Diamond’s medical needs.

## **2) Inadequate training regarding the safety and placement of transgender inmates**

Diamond alleges that Lewis, as a final policy- and decision-maker, inadequately trained subordinates regarding the safety and protection of transgender inmates. Diamond argues a widespread pattern of abuse by prison officials put Lewis on notice of the deficiency in training. Lewis contends Diamond’s allegations are a formulaic recitation of the elements of a failure-to-train claim. But contrary to Lewis’s assertion, Diamond alleges “numerous instances of abuse ..., separated in time, involving distinct [GDOC] officials and personnel at [three] different [GDOC] facilities, all based on her status as a transgender woman.” (Doc. 49 at 26). Specifically, Diamond alleges Lewis was aware from GDOC’s own policies that transgender inmates are highly vulnerable to sexual assaults and that their housing placements are to be reviewed by personnel when safety issues arise. (Doc. 3, ¶¶ 52-61). Despite these policies, Diamond alleges she was placed at three closed-security facilities and was repeatedly sexually assaulted at each one. (Doc. 3, ¶¶ 65-71). Diamond alleges at least six specific incidents of sexual assault across three of GDOC’s facilities and persistent sexual harassment and coercion over the duration of her confinement within these facilities.

Diamond then alleges GDOC personnel repeatedly failed to reasonably respond to the substantial risk of sexual assault: they failed to review her placement pursuant to PREA and Sexual Assault SOP guidelines, delayed and deferred any action after the incidents of assault, ignored her sexual assault complaints and requests to transfer, and disregarded mental health professionals' conclusions she "faced continued vulnerability to sexual assault" at closed-security facilities. (Doc. 3, ¶¶ 70-72, 92-94, 98-103, 106-107, 119-120). Indeed, Diamond alleges that intake personnel at Valdosta State Prison directly told her the prison could not "safely house transgender persons" and that she "stood a high likelihood of being sexually assaulted based on the inmate population." (Doc. 3, ¶ 93). In sum, these allegations are not simply threadbare recitations there was a widespread pattern of abuse. Rather, Diamond has provided sufficient factual support to show a widespread, flagrant, obvious pattern of a continued duration that GDOC officials failed to reasonably respond to multiple incidents of sexual assaults or to the substantial risk of assault Diamond faced at closed-security facilities.

Further, Diamond has sufficiently alleged Lewis deliberately chose not to remedy this inadequate training despite her responsibility to review the placement of transgender inmates and train subordinates regarding their safety. According to Diamond, Lewis was notified pursuant to GDOC policy that Diamond had been repeatedly sexually assaulted at each closed-security facility where she had been housed. (Doc. 3, ¶¶ 60, 69, 71, 94, 100, 106, 149). But Diamond continued to be transferred to closed-security facilities where she experienced sexual assault, and Lewis otherwise failed to institute corrective measures to ensure that subordinates took steps to protect Diamond from the risk of sexual assault. *See Am. Fed'n of Labor &*

*Cong. of Indus. Orgs.,*

3, ¶ 18). Thus, Lewis was responsible for “directing ... the policy” and “enforcing [the] orders, rules, and regulations” that apply to all facilities within GDOC. See *Valdes*, 450 F.3d at 1244.

With respect to the allegedly inadequate training regarding the medical treatment of transgender inmates, it was clearly established Lewis’s failure to adequately train subordinates or otherwise take reasonable institutive corrective measures “in the face of a history of widespread abuse” was unlawful. See *id.* at 1244. As discussed, Diamond has sufficiently alleged that Lewis was on notice from a widespread pattern of abuse that GDOC personnel across multiple facilities were denying gender dysphoria treatment in a deliberately indifferent manner. But despite her notice from this pattern and despite her responsibilities as supervisor, Lewis failed to train subordinates or otherwise take institutive corrective action. See *Greason*, 891 F.2d at 838-39 (holding the supervisor liable where after staff abruptly terminated an inmate’s psychiatric care, the supervisor took no corrective action despite notice of a prior incident where staff similarly denied psychiatric care and being specifically put on notice of inadequacies leading to this termination of care). Indeed, as discussed, Lewis repeatedly enforced the blanket practice to deny gender dysphoria treatment. Accordingly, Lewis is not entitled to qualified immunity from the failure-to-train claim regarding medical treatment.

Likewise, with respect to the allegedly inadequate training regarding the safety and placement of transgender inmates, it was clearly established Lewis’s failure to take reasonable institutive corrective procedures “in the face of a history of widespread abuse” was unlawful. See *Valdes*, 450 F.3d at 1244. As discussed, Diamond has sufficiently alleged that Lewis was on notice that GDOC personnel across multiple



facilities repeatedly ignored the substantial risk of harm Diamond faced as a transgender inmate at closed-security facilities with violent offenders, continued to place her at such facilities, ignored her sexual assault reports, and otherwise delayed action and review when safety issues arose. But despite her notice from this pattern and despite her responsibilities as a supervisor, Lewis failed to train subordinates or enact institutive corrective action. See *LaMarca v. Turner*, 995 F.2d 1526, 1535 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding a supervisor's conduct unlawful when he failed to take institutive corrective measures after receiving numerous reports that inmates were subjected to a continuous threat of violence, including sexual assault); see also *Brown v. Smith*, 2006 WL 1890192, at \*7 (M.D. Ga.) ("After the Eleventh Circuit recognized in *LaMarca* that a prison supervisor can be held liable for his failure to train and supervise his employees to prevent inmate violence, any reasonable prison or jail supervisor would conclude that his failure to implement training and supervisory measures to prevent sexual assaults by his own employees could also subject him to supervisory liability under § 1983."). Accordingly, Lewis is not entitled to qualified immunity on the failure-to-train claim regarding the safety and placement of transgender inmates.

#### IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Defendants' motions to dismiss are **DENIED**. (Docs. 35; 38).

**SO ORDERED**, this 14th day of September, 2015.

S/ Marc T. Treadwell  
MARC T. TREADWELL, JUDGE  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT