

DECLARATION OF HOMER VENTERS, M.D.

I, Homer Venters, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as follows:

BACKGROUND

1. I am a physician, internist and epidemiologist with over a decade of experience in providing, improving and leading health services for incarcerated people. My clinical training includes a residency in internal medicine at Albert Einstein/Montefiore Medical Center (2007) and a fellowship in public health research at the New York University School of Medicine (2009). My experience in correctional health includes two years visiting immigration detention centers and conducting analyses of physical and mental health policies and procedures for persons detained by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. This work included and resulted in collaboration with ICE on numerous individual cases of medical release, formulation of health-related policies as well as testimony before the U.S. Congress regarding mortality inside ICE detention facilities.
2. After my fellowship training, I became the Deputy Medical Director of the NYC Jail including physical and mental health, addiction, quality improvement, re-entry and morbidity and mortality reviews as well as all training and oversight of physicians, nursing and pharmacy staff. In these roles I was also responsible for evaluating and making recommendations on the health implications of numerous security policies and practices including use of force and restraints. During this time, I managed multiple communicable disease outbreaks including H1N1 in 2009, which impacted almost a third of housing areas inside the adolescent jail, multiple seasonal influenza outbreaks, a recurrent legionella infection and several other smaller outbreaks.
3. In March 2017, I left Correctional Health Services of NYC to become the Director of Programs for Physicians for Human Rights. In this role, I oversaw all programs of Physicians for Human Rights, including training of physicians, judges and law enforcement staff on forensic evaluation and documentation, analysis of mass graves and mass atrocities, documentation of torture and sexual violence, and analysis of attacks against healthcare workers.
- 4.

Services (COCHS), a nonprofit organization that promotes evidence-based improvements to correctional practices across the U.S. As of May 1, 2020, I left COCHS to focus exclusively on COVID-19 response work as a medical expert. I wrote a book on the health risks of jail (*Life and Death in Rikers Island*) which was published in early 2019 by Johns Hopkins University Press. A copy of my curriculum vitae, which includes my publications, a listing of cases in which I have been involved and a statement of my compensation, is attached to this report.

TRANSMISSION OF COVID-19

5. Information and understanding about the transmissibility of the coronavirus disease of 2019 (COVID-19) is rapidly evolving. New information is relevant to the health of ICE detainees and staff.
 - a. In addition to transmission by aerosolized droplets expelled from the mouth by speaking, coughing, sneezing, and breathing, COVID-19 appears to be transmissible through aerosolized fecal contact. This is relevant because the plume of aerosolized fecal material that occurs when a toilet is flushed is not addressable in many detention centers because ICE detainee toilets generally lack lids. This mode of transmission would pose a threat to anyone sharing a cell with a person who has COVID-19 and could occur before a person becomes symptomatic. This mode of transmission could also extend beyond cellmates, especially in circumstances where common bathrooms exist or where open communication between cells exists.¹
 - b. CDC and state guidance now recommend the use of protective masks for anyone who is in close contact with others, at less than 6 feet distance.² This recommendation applies to staff and detainees alike.

COVID-19 IN ICE DETENTION

6. COVID-19 is a viral pandemic. This is a novel virus for which there is no established curative medical treatment and no vaccine.
7. ICE has not been able to stop the spread of COVID-19 in detention centers. ICE reported that, as of April 7, there were 19 detained people in 11 facilities, 11 ICE employees in 6 facilities, and 60 ICE employees not assigned to a facility who had all tested positive for COVID-19. As of April 20, less than two weeks later, ICE reported a jump to 220 detained people in 28 facilities, 30 ICE employees in 9 facilities, and 86 ICE employees

not assigned to a facility who had tested positive for COVID-19.³ These numbers, which do not include non-ICE staff and contractors at the facilities, are likely just the tip of the iceberg in terms of the number of ICE staff and detainees who are already infected but are unaware due to the lack of testing nationwide, and the fact that people who are infected can be asymptomatic for several days.

8. When COVID-19 impacts a community, it will also impact the detention facilities. In New York, one of the areas of early spread in the U.S., multiple correctional officers and jail and prison inmates have become infected with COVID-19. The medical leadership in the NYC jail system have announced that they will be unable to stop COVID from entering their facilities and have called for release as the primary response to this crisis. Staff are more likely to bring COVID-19 into a facility, based solely on their movement in and out every day.
9. Once COVID-19 is inside a facility, ICE will be unable to stop the spread of the virus throughout the facility given long-existing inadequacies in ICE's medical care and also in light of how these facilities function. ICE has faced longstanding challenges in maintaining adequate health staffing for many years, and the outbreak of this pandemic will dramatically worsen this problem.
10. I have been inside multiple ICE detention facilities, both county jails that house ICE detainees and dedicated facilities. My experience is that the densely packed housing areas, the structure of health services, food services, recreation, bathroom and shower facilities for detained people, as well as the arrangement of entry points, locker rooms, meal areas, and control rooms for staff, all contribute to many people being in small spaces.
11. Detention facilities are designed to force close contact between people and rely on massive amounts of movement every day from one part of the facility to another, e.g., for programming, access to cafeterias, commissary, and medical, just to name a few. This movement is required of detained people as well as staff. My experience managing smaller outbreaks is that it is impossible to apply hospital-level infection control measures on security staff. In a hospital or nursing home, staff may move up and down a single hallway over their shift, and they may interact with one patient at a time. In detention settings, officers move great distances, are asked to shout or yell commands to large numbers of people, routinely apply handcuffs and operate heavy doors/gates, operate large correctional keys and are trained in the use of force. These basic duties cause the personal protective equipment they are given to quickly break and become useless, and even when in good working order, may impede their ability to talk and be

³ *ICE Guidance on COVID-19*, IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (Updated Apr. 20, 2020), <https://www.ice.gov/coronavirus>.

understood, in the case of masks. For officers working in or around patients at risk or with symptoms, there may be an effort to have them wear protective gowns, as one would in any other setting with similar clinical risks. These gowns cover their radios, cut down their ability to use tools and other equipment located on their belts and in my experience working with correctional staff, are basically impossible to use as a correctional officer.

12. Efforts to lock detained people into cells will worsen, not improve this facility-level contribution to infection control. Units that are comprised of locked cells require additional staff to escort people to and from their cells for showers and other encounters, and medical, pharmacy and nursing staff move on and off these units daily to assess the welfare and health needs of these people, creating the same movement of virus from the community into the facilities as if people were housed in normal units.
13. ICE's detention procedures and practices have manifestly failed to mitigate the rapid spread of the novel coronavirus within their facilities. As of the date of this declaration, there are confirmed cases of COVID-19 among both detainees and staff at the four facilities in this case. Nine detainees and one employee at Stewart Detention Center, two detainees at Irwin County Detention Center, five detainees at LaSalle ICE Processing Center, and seventeen detainees at Pine Prairie ICE Processing Center have tested positive for the virus.⁴ These figures likely underestimate the number of people infected at each facility, as ICE only tests people who meet the CDC's definition of a person under investigation;⁵ that is, someone exhibiting symptoms of COVID-19. Many carriers of coronavirus are asymptomatic, and thus would not qualify for testing by ICE.

ICE RESPONSE TO COVID-19 IN DETENTION CENTERS IS DEFICIENT

14. On the whole, ICE's response to the COVID-19 pandemic is grossly deficient and at odds with recommendations of the CDC regarding detention settings in a manner that threatens the health and survival of ICE detainees. I've reviewed available documents regarding their planning, including the March 6, 2020 interim guidance sheet provided by ICE Health Service Corps,⁶ March 27, 2020 Memorandum to ICE wardens ("March 27 memo"),⁷ ICE's guidance on its website,⁸ the April 4, 2020 Docket Review memo,⁹ and the April 10, 2020 ERO COVID-19 Pandemic Response Requirements ("ERO document" 8mt- 112 -0 0 to ICE4(nt)-MCID 13 >>BDC /TT2 1 Tf -0.002 Tc 0.00 1 Tw -3 -2(A T

answered yes to screening questions. This approach results in a failure to actively

people between facilities, as ICE routinely does and as I understand is still going on, requires far more measures than ICE implements and should be ceased.

24. The March 2020 ICE Protocols failed to address the recommendation of the CDC Detention Guidelines on the need for environmental cleaning of both housing areas and other common spaces within facilities. CDC Detention Guidelines provide clear details about the types of cleaning agents and cleaning processes that should be employed, while ICE provided no guidance to facilities on this critical issue. Reliance on detainees for conducting critical environmental cleaning, without proper training, protection or supervision, represents a gross deviation from correctional practices, and will likely contribute to the spread of COVID-19 throughout the ICE detention system.

B. The April 4, 2020 Docket Review Guidance

25. None of the ICE COVID-19 protocols set forth sufficient policies or protocols addressing release of medically vulnerable detained people in light of the significant risks to those people posed by COVID-19. This must be done immediately and is in contrast to the efforts made in many prison and jail systems across the country.
26. The April 4 list of risk factors for serious illness and death from COVID-19 infection developed by ICE is inconsistent with CDC guidelines and fails to adequately advise facilities on which detainees are at elevated risk. This list is included in a memo to Field Office Directors regarding Docket Review, and fails to include very basic risk factors identified by the CDC, including body mass index over 40 and being a current or former smoker.¹³ By apparently assigning this process to field directors and their staff, who are not medical professionals, advising security staff to check with medical professionals after the fact, and failing to include CDC-identified risk factors, this docket review process will likely leave many people with true risk factors in detention. This is particularly the case if they're detained under certain immigration law provisions, where the guidance recommends officers not release them despite risks. Thus, the guidance appears to be just that – guidance, and the risk factors are not determinative. In fact, the guidance appears to not make these risk factors determinative for release—

- a. Staff who have contact with a known or suspected case of COVID-19 are only mentioned in one section of this document “Exposed employees must then self-monitor for symptoms (i.e., fever, cough, or shortness of breath).” This omits several critical aspects of CDC guidelines that bear on this very scenario, contacts between critical staff and COVID-19 suspected or known cases. The CDC guidelines include the following directives:¹⁶
 - i. Pre-Screen: Employers should measure the employee’s temperature and assess symptoms prior to them starting work. Ideally, temperature checks should happen before the individual enters the facility.
 - ii. Regular Monitoring: As long as the employee doesn’t have a temperature or symptoms, they should self-monitor under the supervision of their employer’s occupational health program.
 - iii. Wear a Mask: The employee should wear a face mask at all times while in the workplace for 14 days after last exposure. Employers can issue face masks or can approve employees’ supplied cloth face coverings in the event of shortages.
 - iv. Social Distance: The employee should maintain 6 feet and practice social distancing as work duties permit in the workplace.
 - v. Disinfect and Clean work spaces: Clean and disinfect all areas such as offices, bathrooms, common areas, shared electronic equipment routinely.

- b.

32. My experience in reviewing policies and procedures in detention settings around the nation is that many facilities holding ICE detainees do not have such a plan and that since a critical part of the CDC recommendations include preparation for COVID-19, many facilities have already failed to meet many basic elements of the COVID-19 responses recommended by the CDC. Even if ICE is able to ensure and report that every facility has created such a plan, it is likely that the lack of COVID-19 response plan to prepare many facilities and respond to the early stages of the outbreak will increase the risk of serious illness or death. Many ICE facilities are in the throes of COVID-19 infection, and waiting until this pandemic is at its peak to require a mitigation plan represents a gross deviation from both CDC guidelines and basic correctional practice. Key areas of work that must be conducted before COVID-19 arrives include training of staff, ordering of supplies, planning for quarantine housing and monitoring, and identification of surge staffing. Starting these basic tasks immediately makes it much less likely that facilities will succeed in their efforts to slow spread of the virus.
33. The ERO document identifies a list of high-risk conditions that is inconsistent with the guidance given by ERO just days earlier and fails to adhere to CDC guidelines.
- a. The new ERO document fails to identify pregnant or post-partum women. The ERO docket review guidelines dated April 4, 2020, failed to identify smoking history or body mass index over 40 as risk factors, both of which are included by the CDC.
 - b. The age for older detainees was indicated as 65 in the new ERO document and 60 in the prior document. The correct age, based on correctional standards, should be 55.
34. The purpose of the ERO document's identification of high-risk patients is unclear beyond custody review, but it fails to establish any higher level of protection from COVID-19 infection.
- a. The prescribed actions in the ERO document regarding high-risk detainees include identifying who they are, emailing their name, location, medical issues and medications, and facility point of contact information to ICE headquarters apparently for review for release.
 - b. No guidance is given about how these high-risk patients can be protected from being infected with COVID-19, unless and until they are in a quarantine area or have been identified as symptomatic.
 - c. Having identified the detainees who are at increased risk of serious illness and death, and initiated a process to effectuate their release based on that risk, ICE

housing area, cell, bunk or personal effects of detainees, or the

control and increase the risk of serious illness and death in ICE facilities. The ERO document gives some details about cloth masks, but there is no mention of any plan to train, record or supervise members of the respiratory protection team, despite the CDC clearly including security personnel in this team.¹⁹

37. The ERO document fails to address the re-entry needs of people leaving ICE custody. This is a critical failure given their ongoing docket review. The CDC makes clear recommendations on this process:

a. If an individual does not clear the screening process, follow the protocol for a suspected COVID-19 case²⁰ – including putting a face mask on the individual, immediately placing them under medical isolation, and evaluating them for possible COVID-19 testing.

b. If the individual is released before the recommended medical isolation period is complete, discuss release of the individual with state, local, tribal, and territorial health officials.

a core failure of ICE in its obligations to establish quality assurance throughout its detention network.²¹ There is no indication that ICE can adequately monitor the response across its system to COVID-19. Absent robust and centralized oversight, ICE will not be able to provide a coordinated response informed by on-the-ground data from detention centers. This is in stark contrast to many prison systems across the country that are coordinating their efforts, including with health departments.

39. ICE has no plan or even capacity to provide daily clinical guidance to all of the clinical staff it relies on to care for ICE detainees, whether at ICE-operated facilities or contract facilities. The differing levels of oversight and clinical involvement across the various types of ICE facilities means that ICE is unable to promulgate and support a consistent set of clinical practices for all ICE detainees. This is a core failure because of the new nature of COVID-19 and constantly changing clinical guidance on how to treat patients. Daily briefings with health administrators and medical and nursing leadership should be held; both are a core aspect of outbreak management and provide a critical avenue for receiving feedback on real-time conditions inside facilities. ICE has not articulated any plan to ensure that this type of basic communication is in place across its network of detention settings. This guidance should also include uniform recommendations on when and how to transport patients to the hospital. Failure to implement this kind of procedure—particularly in light of the other defects described herein—poses a significant risk to the health and lives of ICE detainees.
40. As ICE determines to release people from detention, they should be afforded symptom screening akin to what is done with staff, but the release of detainees to the community will lower their own risks of infection and will also serve to flatten the overall epidemic curve by decreasing the rate of new infections and the demands on local hospital systems. From a medical and epidemiologic standpoint, people are safer from COVID-19 infection when not detained, and the epidemic curve of COVID-19 on the general community is flattened by having fewer people detained.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Signed this 2nd day of May, 2020 in Port Washington, NY.

²¹ [https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/Bo7a8dhs_des.48/es.6\(IGTJ_0_Tc_0_Tw_30.5_->>Td_\(-\)Tj_0.332_3c_-0.002_3w_0_-2_T](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/Bo7a8dhs_des.48/es.6(IGTJ_0_Tc_0_Tw_30.5_->>Td_(-)Tj_0.332_3c_-0.002_3w_0_-2_T)



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